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Fallback bargaining is a bargaining procedure under which bargainers begin by
indicating their preference rankings over all alternatives.  They then fall back, in lockstep,
to less and less preferred alternatives—starting with first choices, then adding second
choices, and so on—until an alternative is found on which all bargainers agree.  This
common agreement, which becomes the outcome of the procedure, may be different if a
decision rule other than unanimity is used.  The outcome is always Pareto-optimal but
need not be unique; if unanimity is used, it is at least middling in everybody’s ranking.
Fallback bargaining may not select a Condorcet alternative, or even the first choice
of a majority of bargainers.  However, it does maximize bargainers’ minimum
“satisfaction.”  When bargainers are allowed to indicate “impasse” in their rankings—
below which they would not descend because they prefer no agreement to any lower-level
alternative—then impasse itself may become the outcome, foreclosing any agreement.
The vulnerability of fallback bargaining to manipulation is analyzed in terms of
both best responses and Nash equilibria.  Although a bargainer can sometimes achieve a
preferred outcome through an untruthful announcement, the risk of a mutually worst
outcome in a Chicken-type game may well deter the bargainers from attempting to be
exploitative, especially when information is incomplete.
Fallback bargaining seems useful as a practicable procedure if a set of “reasonable”
alternatives can be generated.  It leapfrogs the give-and-take of conventional bargaining,
which often bogs down in details, by finding a suitable settlement through the
simultaneous consideration of all alternatives.
JEL Classification:  D58, D63, D71.  Keywords:  Bargaining; impasse; social
choice; Condorcet winner; implementation; Nash equilibrium.Fallback Bargaining1
Once your fall-back positions are published, you have already fallen back to them (Eban,
1998, p. 81)
1.  Introduction
If two bargainers are in a dispute, at least one must retreat to a fallback position to
reach a settlement.  “Fallback” in our title would therefore seem redundant—all
bargaining involves at least one bargainer’s falling back to a less preferred position in
order to produce a settlement acceptable to both.
To be sure, it would seem unfair, and not “true” bargaining, if one bargainer simply
caved in to the demands of the other.  Accordingly, we ask the following question:   Is
there a procedure that facilitates a compromise, whereby bargainers retreat from their
most-preferred positions in order to achieve an equitable outcome?
We propose such a procedure, called “fallback bargaining,” whereby all
bargainers—not necessarily just two—fall back in lockstep to less and less preferred
positions until they agree on an outcome.  In a variant of this procedure, we allow the
lockstep to be broken if a bargainer reaches a point where it prefers no agreement
(“impasse”) to any alternative that is ranked lower.
Among other things, we demonstrate that fallback bargaining yields an outcome
that is Pareto-optimal and, if there is no impasse, at least “middling” for all the
bargainers.  Moreover, when restricted to just two bargainers, the procedure is difficult
(and frequently impossible) to manipulate, even if the bargainers have complete
information about each other’s preferences.
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Our model extends a bargaining model of Brams and Doherty (1993; see also
Brams, 1994, ch. 7), which presumed that a simple majority, measured by weighted or
unweighted votes, must agree on an alternative.  In the context of voting, Sertel and
Yilmaz (1997) and Hurwicz and Sertel (1997) developed related models, which we shall
say more about later, that focus on majority rule.  While we focus on unanimity as the
decision rule, which seems appropriate in many bargaining situations, we give general
results for any decision rule and for any number of bargainers.
The plan of this paper is as follows.  In section 2, we describe and illustrate
fallback bargaining, assuming a decision rule of unanimity.  We determine the maximum
“depth” to which the bargainers might have to descend before reaching a common
agreement, indicating the parameters to which this depth is sensitive.  In addition, we
prove that fallback bargaining always leads to a Pareto-optimal outcome that maximizes
the minimum satisfaction of all the bargainers (i.e., whose depth for the worst-off
bargainer is minimal).2
In section 3, we compare the situation in which unanimous consent is required to
that in which only a simple or qualified majority of bargainers must agree, as is true in
most voting situations.  We illustrate, among other things, how an outcome under the
                                          
2Proofs of all theorems, corollaries, and lemmata are given in the Appendix—where their
numbering is sometimes different and preceded by A’s—but the numbers in the text are
always keyed to the Appendix numbers.  We follow this unusual convention to
     • facilitate exposition of the material in the text, where we start with fallback
       bargaining with a decision rule of unanimity (section 2) and then generalize to all
       possible decision rules (section 3);
    • save space in the Appendix, where we make some theorems general from the start.
Thus, instead of proving that fallback bargaining maximizes the minimum satisfaction of
all bargainers (Theorem 3), we prove in the Appendix that under any decision rule q,
fallback bargaining maximizes the minimum satisfaction of at least q bargainers
(Theorem A2), where q can range from 1 to n.3
unanimity rule may be less preferred by a majority of bargainers than another alternative
(i.e., the so-called Condorcet winner), which may even be their first choice.
In section 4, we consider the possibility that a bargainer might reach a point in
fallback bargaining whereby it would prefer no agreement, or impasse, to agreement.  We
show that the inclusion of “impasse” in bargainers’ preference orders may lead to Pareto-
optimal outcomes quite different from those without impasse.  These, we suggest, can be
observed in real-life bargaining situations in which bargainers, at some point, refuse to
compromise, preferring stalemate instead.
In section 5, we restrict attention to two-person bargaining situations, which are by
far the most common (Brams, 1990), but we place no restrictions on the number of
possible outcomes.  If there are only two alternatives (e.g., one bargainer wins, the other
loses), it is always optimal for the bargainers to be truthful in ranking alternatives.  But
truthfulness is not always optimal when there are more than two alternatives, as we
demonstrate with two theorems that characterize the best response of one bargainer to the
other’s truthful ranking.
While we leave a characterization of all Nash equilibria in two-person fallback
bargaining games to the Appendix, we offer a quantitative analysis of Nash equilibria in
three-outcome and four-outcome games in section 6.  Although bargainers can benefit
from not being truthful in some games, we argue that they may refrain from trying to be
exploitative in others that are vulnerable to misrepresentation—in particular, a class of
Chicken-like games—because of the serious risks involved should the other bargainer act
similarly.  Thus, both bargainers may be deterred from acting strategically.3
                                          
3To be sure, Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975), and subsequent impossibility results in
the social-choice and game-theoretic literature establish that virtually no bargaining or
voting procedures are immune from manipulation.  These results say little, however,
about the kinds of games that may be played, and their specific vulnerabilities, under
different procedures.  In the case of fallback bargaining, we will argue that, practically
speaking, it would be a difficult procedure to manipulate, especially in games of
incomplete information.4
In section 7, we suggest the kinds of disputes in which bargainers are most likely to
benefit from fallback bargaining, or to act as if they use it.  These informal uses of the
procedure lead us to ask the following questions:
1.  What real-life disputes would be most amenable to the formal use of fallback
bargaining?
2.  Is the resolution of such disputes likely to be fairer, in some sense, than the
resolution that would be achieved without the formal procedure?
We conclude that invoking the formal procedure could facilitate the resolution of certain
kinds of disputes, but it will require considerable care in the generation of alternatives to
which it is applied.
2.  Description and Properties
Assume that there are n bargainers, and the set of alternatives (possible
agreements) is K, where |K| = k.  Each bargainer has a strict preference ranking over the k
alternatives; all rankings can be represented by an n x k matrix, A, whose (i,j)-entry is aij.
Each ranking is given in descending order:  bargainer i’s most preferred alternative is ai1,
its least preferred aik.
To illustrate, suppose the set of alternatives is K = {a, b, c, d}, so k = 4.  Suppose






Bargainer 1’s preference ranking (abcd) is indicated by the first row—from a most
preferred to d least preferred—and bargainer 2’s (bdac) by the second row.
Fallback bargaining proceeds as follows:5
1.  The most-preferred alternative of each bargainer is considered.  If this is the
same for all bargainers, then this common agreement is the bargaining outcome.  The
procedure stops, and we call this a depth 1 agreement.
2.  If there is no common agreement at depth 1 (i.e., not all the bargainers agree on
a most-preferred alternative), then the next-most preferred alternatives of all the
bargainers are considered.  Any alternative within the top two of every bargainer is a
depth 2 agreement (there may be either one or two common agreements at depth 2, as we
will illustrate shortly).  If there is a depth 2 agreement, the procedure stops; otherwise, it
continues.
3.  As long as there is no common agreement, the bargainers descend—one level at
a time—to lower and lower levels in their rankings until the intersection of their top-
ranked alternatives becomes, for the first time, nonempty.  We call the set of common
agreements, when the procedure stops at depth d*, CS(A), or the Compromise Set (CS) of
fallback bargaining for matrix A.
Examples.  The vertical lines in the following 2-bargainer, 4-alternative examples
below  indicate the column in the matrix, going from left to right, at which a common
agreement first appears.  In these four examples, the depth of the agreement, d*, varies
from 1 (A3) to 3 (A4).  Observe that in two of the examples (A1 and A3) the Compromise





















ab,     CS(A4) = {a, c}.6
What is the maximum depth at which a common agreement can appear?  The upper
bound is given by
Theorem 1.  d* • |_k - k/n + 1_|.
Proof.  See the proof of Theorem A1 in the Appendix; an equivalent theorem for
the so-called Kant-Rawls Social Compromise, which also assumes unanimity, is given in
Hurwicz and Sertel (1997).  The proof of the general case—allowing for any decision rule
(not just unanimity), which includes Hurwicz and Sertel’s (1997) so-called Majoritarian
Compromise (simple majority)—is given for Theorem A3 in the Appendix.
Among the earlier examples, A4 shows that the upper bound in Theorem 1 can be
attained:  d* = 3 = |_4 - 4/2 + 1_|; in the Appendix, we show that this bound is always
tight.  We next consider how the upper bound of Theorem 1 behaves as n or as k
increases:
1.  Dependence on n.  As the number n of bargainers increases, but the number k
of alternatives remains fixed, the upper bound on depth eventually reaches k, the number
of alternatives.  Thus, if k = 4 (as in our previous examples), and n increases from 2 to 4,
fallback bargaining may have to descend to d* = 4 before the Compromise Set becomes








      CS(A5) = {a, b, c, d}.
For any preference matrix A, and any alternative x Î K, we define m(x) = m(x, A),
the mean depth of x in A,  to equal the (arithmetic) average rank of x over all rows of A.
For instance, m(a) = m(x, A5) = (1 + 4 + 3 + 2)/4 = 2.5.
In A5, the maximal depth of the agreement is mitigated by the fact that all four
alternatives are in the Compromise Set.  If one of these is selected at random as the
outcome, then the probability that a bargainer will suffer its worst outcome is only 25%.7
Moreover, the mean depth of the outcome thus selected is m(a) = m(b) = m(c) = m(d) =
2.5, so on average each bargainer obtains a middling outcome.
2.  Dependence on k.  As the number k of alternatives increases, but the number of
bargainers n remains fixed, the upper bound on depth approaches (1 - 1/n)k + 1 =
[(n - 1)/n]k + 1, or a fixed fraction of k plus 1.  For example, if n = 2 (as in our first four
examples), and k increases from 4 to 8, the upper bound given by Theorem 1 increases









cd,     CS(A6) = {a, e}.
In this example, the worst-case scenario for each bargainer is a below-average alternative
(5th out of 8), whereas the best-case scenario is a best alternative (1st out of 8).  Thus,
m(a, A6) = m(e, A6) = (1 + 5)/2 = 3.
As the examples above illustrate, fallback bargaining yields, on average, outcomes
that are at least middling for each bargainer, whatever the number of bargainers or the
number of alternatives.  In the case of two bargainers and two alternatives, a and b—in
which one bargainer prefers a to b and the other b to a—the Compromise Set will be
simply {a, b}.  This, of course, is hardly a resolution of their bargaining problem.
If, however, both bargainers think some compromise alternative c is better than the
other bargainer’s preferred alternative, then c will be the outcome of fallback bargaining





a ,     CS(A7) = {c}.
In the concluding section, we will suggest how, through the introduction of several
compromise alternatives, fallback bargaining can be rendered a useful practical device for
finding an acceptable resolution.
Next we give lower and upper bounds on the number of alternatives in the
Compromise Set:8
Lemma 1.  1 • | CS | • min{d*, n}
Proof.  See the proof of Lemma A1 in the Appendix.  The proof of the general case
for any decision rule is given for Lemma A2 in the Appendix.
The lower bound on the number of outcomes in the Compromise Set is illustrated by A1,
A3,  and A7, and the upper bound by A2, A4 , and  A5.
Of course, if the number of alternatives in the Compromise Set is large, as in
example A5 [|CS(A5)| = 4], there is no ready resolution of the bargaining problem.  But
this result, we would argue, is to be expected in this example, because majorities cycle:
a > b > c > d > a, where “>” indicates majority preference.  Later we shall consider
examples in which preferences are not cyclical and ask whether fallback bargaining
chooses a “desirable” alternative.
Next we ask whether fallback bargaining always leads to a Pareto-optimal
outcome.4
Theorem 2.  If x ÎCS, then x is Pareto-optimal.
Proof.  See the proof of Theorem A4 in the Appendix, which also covers the
general case (i.e., any decision rule).
Example A1 shows that the converse of Theorem 2 is false:  alternative a is Pareto-
optimal but does not belong to the Compromise Set.  More specifically,
Theorem 3.  The Compromise Set comprises all Pareto-optimal alternatives that
maximize the minimum ranking of the bargainers.
Proof.  See the proof of Theorem A2 in the Appendix, which also covers the
general case (i.e., any decision rule).
                                          
4Let x and y be any two outcomes.  We say x is Pareto-superior to y, written x  y, if all
the bargainers rank x higher than y; in this case, y is Pareto-inferior to x.  If y has the
property that there exists no x such that x  y, then y is Pareto-optimal.9
Notice in example A1 that there are two Pareto-optimal alternatives, a and b.
(Alternative c is Pareto-inferior to both a and b, and alternative d is Pareto-inferior to b.)
The lowest ranking that either bargainer assigns to a is 3, and the lowest ranking that
either bargainer assigns to b is 2.  Consequently, the Compromise Set is {b}, which, as
shown below, is the first alternative to become common:
• 0 common at depth 1:  {Æ}
• 1 common at depth 2:  {b}
• 2  common at depth 3:  {a, b}
• 4 common at depth 4:  {a, b, c, d}.
In examples A2 - A6, the Compromise Sets contain all the Pareto-optimal
alternatives.  By contrast, all three alternatives are Pareto-optimal in example A7, but only
alternative c is in the Compromise Set:  it becomes common at depth 2, whereas the
Pareto-optimal alternatives, a and b, do not become common until depth 3.
In summary, the Compromise Set produces outcomes that are Pareto-optimal
(Theorem 2) and at least middling (Theorem 1), based on their depth or mean depth.
These outcomes also maximize the minimum satisfaction that any bargainer enjoys
(Theorem 3):  the lowest rank given by a bargainer to any alternative not in the
Compromise Set, even if it is Pareto-optimal, is always less.5
3.  Alternative Decision Rules
The choice of a middling outcome may be controversial, as example A8 illustrates:
                                          
5Fallback bargaining, however, fails one of Arrow’s (1963) contions (as it must):
independence from irrelevant alternatives.  Thus in A2, if the preference ranking of
bargainer 2 changes from bacd to cbad (i.e., bargainer 2 moves c up from third to first
place without changing the ranking of the other alternatives), the Compromise Set would
change from {a, b} to {b}.  In other words, the preference of bargainer 2 for “irrelevant
alternative” c affects the social choice between a and b, lowering a in the social ordering






dcba,     CS(A8) = {b}.
Notice that alternative b is at rank 2 for two bargainers and at rank 3 for two bargainers,
giving it a mean rank of 2.50.  By comparison, alternative a is at rank 1 for three
bargainers and at rank 4 for one bargainer, so its mean rank is 1.75.  Moreover, not only
is a the Condorcet winner (in pairwise contests, a majority prefers it to every other
alternative), but it is also ranked first by three of the four bargainers.  Nevertheless,
fallback bargaining chooses b, whose only merit seems to be that nobody dislikes it too
much (by ranking it last).
The choice of b, we believe, is quite indefensible in a voting situation.  Indeed, not
only would a Condorcet voting procedure select a, but so would virtually all other voting
procedures, including the Borda count and the Hare system of single transferable vote.
On the other hand, insofar as unanimous consent is required in a bargaining situation, the
choice of b seems to us entirely appropriate.
To be sure, if majority support were deemed sufficient to reach a consensus in a
bargaining situation, then fallback bargaining could be modified to reflect this less
stringent decision rule.  With this modification, a would be chosen at the outset (i.e., at
depth 1) in A8.6
In all 2-person bargaining situations, of course, the unanimity decision rule is the
same as the majority decision rule, so there would be no change of outcome sets in our
previous 2-person examples.  Neither would there be in our earlier 4-person example
(A5), in which majorities cycle (i.e., there is no Condorcet outcome).
                                          
6If the Condorcet winner, a, were deleted from every bargainer’s ranking, the
Compromise Set would expand from {b} to {b, c, d}:  all three remaining (Pareto-
optimal) alternatives would be selected by fallback bargaining.  In fact, all four
alternatives are Pareto-optimal in A8; fallback bargaining singles out b as the outcome, in
contrast to the simple-majority outcome, a.11
In general, however, the decision rule will make a difference in n-person
bargaining situations.  Consequently, bargainers must decide what is an appropriate level
of consensus to require in order to make an agreement binding on all parties.
We next can generalize fallback bargaining to q-approval fallback bargaining, in
which the decision rule is that, for acceptance, the approval of at least q (for quota)
bargainers is required, where q lies between 1 and n inclusive.  Until now, we have used
the decision rule q = n (i.e., unanimity).  Normally, we suppose, the quota will be at least
a simple majority of bargainers (i.e., q • |_(n + 1)/2_|), but our results apply for any q in
the range 1 • q • n.
The use of q-approval fallback bargaining produces the q-approval Compromise
Set, CSq, which is the set of alternatives that are approved of, for the first time as the
depth increases, by at least q bargainers.  For every q, there will be a dq*; when q = n
(under fallback bargaining), d* = dn*.
To illustrate the effects of different quotas, consider again example A8:
CS1(A8) = {a, d} at depth d1* = 1
CS2(A8) = {a} at depth d2*= 1
CS3(A8) = {a} at depth d3* = 1 (simple majority decision rule)
CS4(A8) = CS(A8) = {b} at depth d4* = d* = 3 (unanimity decision rule).
Alternative a is what Hurwicz and Sertel (1997) call the “Majoritarian Compromise,”
whereas alternative b, our fallback-bargaining outcome, is what they call the “Kant-Rawls
Social Compromise.”7  In the Appendix, we give generalizations of Theorem 1, Lemma
1, Theorem 2, and Theorem 3, which we summarize as follows:
                                          
7The Majoritarian Compromise will always be selected from the left half of alternatives
in A (Sertel and Yilmaz, 1997; Hurwicz and Sertel, 1997), whereas the Kant-Rawls Social
Compromise might force a descent to the greatest possible depth (i.e., the right-most
column), so one bargainer (or more) might obtain its worst alternative.12
General Results for q-Level Fallback Bargaining.  For 1 • q • n,
• the upper bound on depth is dq* • |_(kq - k + n)/n_| (Theorem A3);
• bounds on the size of CSq are 1 < |CSq| < min{nd*/q, n} (Lemma A2);
• if x  ÎCSq, then x is Pareto-optimal (Theorem A4)
• the alternatives in  CSq maximize the minimum  satisfaction of  the q most
  satisfied bargainers (Theorem A2).
The Pareto-optimality of all alternatives chosen by q-level fallback bargaining,
from q = 1 to q = n, is perhaps surprising.  This fact, however, is not a good reason for
considering all these alternatives to be serious candidates for outcomes of either a
bargaining process or a voting process.  For example, alternative d in example A8 is in
CS1; but because it is the last choice of two of the four bargainers, it is not an alternative
that we would recommend as a consensus choice.
Alternative c is the one alternative in example A8 that is not chosen by q-level
fallback bargaining for any q.  Nevertheless, it is Pareto-optimal, demonstrating that the
members of all Compromise Sets do not exhaust the set of Pareto-optimal alternatives.
More surprising, perhaps, is that q = |_(n + 1)/2_| (simple majority), which does
choose the Condorcet alternative a in example A8 when fallback bargaining (unanimity)









cdaeb,     CS4 = {b}.
Alternative b is, in fact, the Condorcet loser—majorities prefer it to each of the other
alternatives in this example—whereas alternative a is the Condorcet winner.  Moreover,
fallback bargaining (q = 7) finds a at depth d* = 3, suggesting it to be a “better” decision13
rule in this instance (actually, any qualified majority q > 4 finds a).  Thus, the case for the
Majoritarian Compromise, which chooses {b}, seems weak in example A9.
It is worth noting that the Condorcet winner may be chosen using non-majority






Notice that a is in the Compromise Sets for both q = 1 and q = 2, but it is alternative b,
chosen by fallback bargaining (q = 3), that seems most to deserve the appellation
“compromise”:
CS1(A10) = {a, c} at depth d1* = 1
CS2(A10) = {a} at depth d2*= 1 (simple majority decision rule)
CS3(A10) = {b} at depth d3*= d* = 2 (unanimity decision rule).
In example A11 below, there is no Condorcet winner because there is a paradox of
voting, in which majorities cycle:  c > a > d > e > c, where “>” indicates the majority







As in example A10, the Compromise Sets in A11 yield all possible outcomes:
CS1(A11) = {a, b, c} at depth d1* = 1
CS2(A11) = {a, b} at depth d2* = 1
CS3(A11) = {d} at depth d3*= 2 (simple majority decision rule)
CS4(A11) = {e} at depth d4* = 3 (qualified majority decision rule)
CS5(A11) = CS(A11) = {c} at depth d5* = d* = 4 (unanimity).14
Not only is alternative d, the simple-majority outcome, not a Condorcet winner, but q = 4
(qualified majority) gives a different outcome from either q = 3 (simple majority) or q = 5
(unanimity).  Because all five alternatives are chosen by the various q’s, a consensus
choice is by no means evident.
Clearly, the decision rule, even when restricted to a simple majority or greater, can
make a big difference in the outcome.  In the concluding section, we will turn to the
question of what level of consensus should be required in order to implement a
compromise agreement.
4.  The Effects of Impasse
We next consider the possibility that bargainers set limits—or “reservation prices,”
in the vernacular of economics—on how low they will dip in their rankings before
“throwing in the towel” (i.e., giving up rather than accepting a less-preferred agreement).
Specifically, assume that each bargainer puts I (for impasse) in its preference ranking at
the level at which it prefers no agreement to any lower-level alternative.  We call this
modification of fallback bargaining fallback bargaining with impasse.8
Fallback bargaining with impasse proceeds exactly as does fallback bargaining, but
with one restriction.  Once the descent process reaches I for a bargainer, it stops for that
bargainer.  If no common agreement is reached by the time the level descends to every
bargainer’s I, I—not an alternative in K—is the outcome.
In fallback bargaining with impasse, the Compromise Set is called CSI, and it is
reached at depth d*.  If there are n bargainers and the alternative set is K, where |K| = k,
                                          
8Brams and Doherty (1993; see also Brams, 1994, ch. 7) were the first to introduce
impasse into the preferences of bargainers.  Like Sertel and Yilmaz (1997) and Hurwicz
and Sertel (1997), they assumed that only a simple majority of bargainers need agree on
an alternative in order for it to be chosen.  Unlike the present model, however, I can be
breached in the Brams-Doherty (1993) model:  a bargainer will support an alternative
below I  if there is another alternative that would otherwise be chosen that the bargainer
ranks still lower than I.  Thus, I is not an impregnable barrier in their model.15
then preferences are given not by an n x k matrix A but by an n x (k + 1) matrix B, in
which the ith row gives bargainer i’s ranking of K È {I}.
Examples.  In the following four examples, the preference rankings of the two
bargainers for the set of four possible agreements, {a, b, c, d}, duplicate those of example
A4 earlier.  Now, however, the appearance of I at different levels in each bargainer’s




























I ,     CSI(B4) = {a, c}.
 Notice that the common agreements in the Compromise Sets are either Pareto-
superior to I or I itself.  Moreover, if either a or c is Pareto-superior to I, then it falls in
the Compromise Set.  That this is no accident is shown by
Theorem 4.  Let the n x (k + 1) matrix B describe the preferences of the
bargainers under fallback bargaining with impasse.  Let x Î K, the set of alternatives,
and construct the n x k matrix A by deleting I from each row of B.  Then  x Î CSI(B) if
x   I (i.e., x is Pareto-superior to I) and x Î CS(A); if I Î CSI(B), then I is the unique
member of CSI(B).
Proof.  See Theorem A5 in the Appendix.
Corollary 1.  All elements of CSI(B) are Pareto-optimal.
                                          
9As before, in each example we indicate with vertical lines the level, going from left to
right, at which common agreement(s) or I  first appear.  Notice that in all the examples
except B4, at least one bargainer “reaches” I, but it never descends past it.16
Proof.  See Corollary A1 in the Appendix.   
Let x Î K.  Theorem 4 states that if x Î CS(A) and x  I, then x Î CSI(B).  The
converse, however, is not true.  If x Î CS(B), then x  I, but it is nonetheless possible that









a ,    CS(A5) = {b}.
Here a, which is Pareto-superior to I, is the only member of the Compromise Set with
impasse, whereas b is the only member of the corresponding Compromise Set without
impasse.
It follows from Theorem 4 that I is the unique member of the Compromise Set with
impasse iff I is Pareto-optimal.  To determine CSI, one can begin by finding alternatives
Pareto-superior to I; if there are none, then CSI contains only I.
An example that illustrates this rule, wherein b is the only alternative Pareto-







I ,      CSI(B6) = {b}.
Not surprisingly, the most intransigent bargainer—the one that ranks I highest (bargainer
2, or B2, whose preferences are given in the second row of B6)—is the one that gets its
most-preferred alternative (b).10
The choice of b in this example might be contested on the ground that a majority of
bargainers (B1 and B3) prefer a to b, which we write as a > b.  But, in fact, the story is
                                          
10If either B1 or B3 tried to be more intransigent for strategic reasons (i.e.,  by ranking,
against its true preferences, I higher than b rather than vice versa), then I would be the
outcome.  Thus, being “strategically” intransigent may succeed only in sabotaging a
preferred agreement, especially if the other bargainers are acting similarly.17
more complicated than this, because majorities cycle:  a > b > I > c > a, where “>“
indicates majority preference.  Thus, there is a paradox of voting that includes I.11
If we rule out c on the ground that a majority of bargainers (B1 and B2) prefer I to
c, this still leaves a and b as viable possibilities.  While b is the fallback bargaining
outcome and also has the greater mean depth, one wonders whether the fact that a > b
should not swing the bargaining choice toward a.
In the normative social-choice and voting literature, questions such as this are
addressed, but we will not pursue them further here.  Suffice it to say that fallback
bargaining with impasse produces a set of Pareto-optimal alternatives, or impasse, that
maximize the minimum satisfaction of bargainers—but now with I excluding certain
alternatives that, without I, might have been considered satisfactory.
We turn next to an analysis of the vulnerability of fallback bargaining to strategic
manipulation, first by characterizing best responses (section 5) and then Nash equilibria
(section 6).  To keep matters simple, we will restrict the analysis to two bargainers and
assume that they cannot indicate impasse.  In section 7 we will offer some thoughts on
generalizing our results, allowing both for more bargainers and for the possibility of
impasse.
5.  Vulnerability of Two-Person Fallback Bargaining:  Best Responses
In section 2 we discussed the situation in which there are only two alternatives, a
and b, wherein B1 prefers a to b and B2 prefers b to a.  If each bargainer truthfully
indicates its preference, the Compromise Set is {a, b}.
                                          
11If I were deleted from the rankings of B6, then the paradox of voting would remain,
whereby a > b > c > a.  In this case, fallback bargaining (without impasse) would give
{a, b, c} as the Compromise Set, whereas B6 (with the I’s included) singles out b.   We
see nothing wrong with the fact that inclusion of the I’s narrows down the outcomes in
the Compromise Set.18
Neither bargainer can do better by being untruthful.  For example, if B2 indicated
that it, like B1, preferred a to b, then it would succeed only in ensuring its less preferred
alternative, a.
But with as few as three alternatives, fallback bargaining becomes vulnerable to
strategic misrepresentation.  To illustrate, assume the truthful preferences of two




bac,    CS(A12) = {a, b}.
Now if B1 announced its preferences to be those shown in the first row of either examples
A13 or A14  below, and B2 stuck with its true preferences in the second row, the
Compromise Set would be a singleton, containing B1’s most-preferred alternative:
A13 = 
acb
bac,     CS(A13) = {a}
A14 = 
cab
bac,     CS(A14) = {a}.
Thus, B1 would have good reason to falsify its preference ranking if it knew (i) B2’s true
preference ordering and (ii) that B2 did not know it was being manipulated in this way
(and would have no reason, therefore, not to be truthful).
The relationship of the orderings selected by the bargainers to the resulting
Compromise Set constitute the game-form of fallback bargaining (Hurwicz, 1996).  For
the case of k = 3 alternatives, the game-form is shown in Figure 1 (ignore the asteriks for
________________________________________________________________________
Figure 1 about here
________________________________________________________________________
for now).  Note that the game-form does not describe preferences; nonetheless, it is a
natural tool to study the consequences of a bargainer’s reporting its preferences, either
truthfully or untruthfully.19
For instance, suppose that B1’s true preference ordering is abc.  From Figure 1, one
can determine whether reporting abc, or some other ordering, gives B1 a better outcome.
As we show in the Appendix, B1 cannot do better than choose abc if B2’s ordering is any
of abc, acb, bca, cba, or cab, but if B2’s odering is bac, B1 is better off choosing acb.
Whether bargainers can benefit from misrepresenting their preferences rather than
reporting them truthfully is essentially the question that Sertel and Yilmaz (1997) and
Hurwicz and Sertel (1997) ask concerning the |_(n + 1)/2_|-approval Compromise Set (or
the Majoritarian Compromise).  Like them, we show that Nash-equilibrium
implementability is impossible12—not for the Majoritarian Compromise, however, but for
fallback bargaining.  As a prelude to characterizing Nash equilibria under fallback
bargaining, we examine the optimal response of one bargainer (truthful or untruthful) to
the other bargainer’s ranking.
Theorems 5 and 6 below cover, respectively, the cases of an odd and an even
number of alternatives k:
Theorem 5.  If k = 2h - 1 is odd (so h is integral), and B2’s ranking, b, is fixed and
known to B1, then the best Compromise Set that B1 can achieve is a singleton containing
B1’s most-preferred alternative among b1, b2, . . .,   bh  (i.e., among the top h items in
B2’s ranking).  Call this best alternative br. To achieve {br}, B1 submits its true ordering,
a, unless br  is ranked (strictly) lower by B2 than by B1, and there are alternatives ranked
at or above level r by B1 that are preferred to br  by B2.  In this case, B1 can achieve {br}
                                          
12Sertel and Yilmaz (1997) demonstrate, additionally, that the Majoritarian Compromise
is subgame-perfect implementable, but they do not find any “natural” mechanism for
effecting such implementation.  In the absence of a simple mechanism—whose message
space can easily be explained to voters—we will concentrate in section 6 on the
conditions under which, when the message space is the bargainers’ direct statement of
their preferences, truthful revelation is a Nash equilibrium.  (Our theorems in section 6,
however, characterize all Nash equilbria—both those involving truthful revelation and
those involving misrepresenation.)20
by switching these alternatives with alternatives that would otherwise be below level r in
both B1’s and B2’s orderings.
Proof.  See the proof of Theorem A6 in the Appendix.
Examples A15, A16, and A17 illustrate Theorem 5.
Examples.  Let k = 7 and suppose the preference ranking of B1 is abcdefg.  If B2’s
ranking is edbgacf, we have, if both B1 and B2 are truthful,
A15 =  
abcdefg
edbcagf,     CS(A15) = {b}.
Because B1’s most-preferred alternative up to level h = 4 in B2’s ordering is b, the best
Compromise Set that B1 can achieve is {b}.  With respect to Theorem 5, r = 3.  While
alternative b is ranked higher by B1 than by B2, there are no alternatives ranked at or
above level r = 3 by B1 and preferred to b by B2.  Therefore, B1’s best response is to be
truthful.
Now assume that B2’s ranking is cegbadf.  If B1 is truthful, we have
A16 = 
abcdefg
cegbadf ,      CS(A16) = {c}.
Because B1’s most-preferred alternative up to level h = 4 in B2’s ordering is b, again the
best Compromise Set that B1 can achieve is {b}.  With respect to Theorem 5, r = 4.  But
because alternative c is ranked at or above level 4 by B1, and it is preferred to alternative
b by B2, B1 can do better by falsifying its preferences.  Following Theorem 5, B1 can
switch alternative c with an alternative that is ranked below level 4 in both bargainers’
rankings, which is alternative f in example A16.
If B1 interchanges c and f in its truthful ranking—announcing abfdecg instead—the
Compromise Set is indeed {b } rather than {c }:
A17 = 
abfdecg
ceg badf ,     CS(A17) = {b}.21
Thus, B1 obtains its second rather than its third choice when it acts strategically,
according to Theorem 5.
Theorem 6.  If k = 2h is even (so h is integral), and B2’s ranking, b, is fixed and
known to B1, then the best Compromise Set that B1 can achieve is either {br}, containing
B1’s most-preferred alternative among the top h alternatives in B2’s ranking, or
{br, bh+1},.  The latter is preferred to the former iff bh+1 > br (i.e., if bh+1 is preferred to br
according to B1’s true ordering, a).  To achieve a Compromise Set of the form {br}, B1’s
choice of ordering is essentially the same as in Theorem 5.  To achieve a Compromise Set
of the form {br, bh+1}, B1’s ordering must place br  at level  h + 1, which is a necessary
condition for B1 to be able to submit its true ranking.  If this condition is not satisfied by
B1’s truthful ranking, it can always be arranged to do so.
Proof.  See the proof of Theorem A7 in the Appendix.
To show the interesting twist that can occur when the number of alternatives is
even, let k = 6.  Suppose that B1’s true ranking is abcdef, and that B1 knows that B2 will
submit the ranking fcdbea.  If B1 submits its true ranking, the Compromise Set will be
{c}.  But by reporting its ranking to be abecdf, B1 can achieve a Compromise Set that it
prefers to {c}:
A18 =  
abecdf
f cdbea,    CS(A18) = {b, c}.
An essential step in constructing B1’s reported ranking is to move d below the fourth
level.
Finally, in the Appendix we note that there is no limit to the number of ordinal
rankings by which B1 can improve the Compromise Set by misrepresenting its
preferences.  To illustrate this result when there are k = 9 alternatives (so h = 5), suppose
that B1’s true preference ordering is abdcefghi, and that B2 submits the ranking22
defgabchi.  By reporting its true ranking, B1 obtains the Compromise Set {d}; but by
reporting ranking abchifgde, B1 improves the Compromise Set by h - 2 = 3 ordinals:
A19 = 
abchifgde
def gabchi,    CS(A19) = {a}.
As shown in the Appendix, this example can be generalized to any value of h (and k =
2h - 1) to show that B1 can improve the Compromise Set, relative to truthful reporting, by
h - 2 ordinals.
So far we have assumed that B1 has complete information about B2’s ranking of
alternatives.  Moreover, B1 knows what ranking B2 will submit (truthful or not), perhaps
by having a spy in B2’s camp.  Thereby B1 can formulate a best response, which may
involve making a false announcement of its preference ranking.
In most bargaining situations, however, it is unlikely that there will be such an
asymmetry of information that would allow B1 to exploit B2 in this manner.  Thus, we
next turn to an analysis of the game that two bargainers play when they both know each
other’s preference rankings and must, independently, choose announcement strategies.   
6.  Vulnerability of Two-Person Fallback Bargaining:  Nash Equilibria
To illustrate our general results that characterize all Nash equilibria in two-person
fallback bargaining games, we start with the case of k = 3 alternatives, {a, b, c}.
Consider the 2 x 2 game between B1 with preferences abc and B2 with preferences bac.
Assume each bargainer may be either truthful in its announcement (first strategy) or
untruthful (second strategy):
                                    B2
               bac        bca
                abc    {a, b}      {b}
         B1
    acb      {a}        {c}23
Clearly, each bargainer does better by being untruthful when the other bargainer is
truthful—obtaining its best possible Compromise Set ({a} for B1 and {b} for B2)—
whereas each bargainer gets its worst Compromise Set, {c}, when both bargainers are
untruthful.  In between, both bargainers obtain a middling Compromise Set, {a, b}, when
both are truthful.  This game is, in fact, Chicken, and outcomes {a} and {b}, which we
have underscored, represent the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria.13
Theorems A8 and A9 in the Appendix establish necessary and sufficient
conditions for pairs of rankings to be Nash equilibria.  These theorems, which
characterize all Nash equilibria in two-person fallback bargaining games—in which
unanimity and majority rule are the same—are analogous to Theorems 5 and 6 in section
6 (there is both an odd and even case).14
 To continue our development of the k = 3 case, the two pure-strategy Nash
equilibria shown in the 2 x 2 game become four pure-strategy Nash equilibria in an
expanded 3 x 3 game that includes additional strategies cab for B1 and cba for B2:
                                              B2
                 bac         bca       cba
                 abc     {a, b}      {b}       {b}
        B1    acb       {a}         {c}       {c}
    cab       {a}         {c}       {c}
                                          
13If the payoffs to the bargainers were in cardinal utilities, there would be a third mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium.  Even if we were to assume payoffs in utiles, the mixed-
strategy equilibrium would not be compelling because it is Pareto-inferior to {a, b}.
14Because Theorems A7 and A8 require considerable technical development to state
precisely, we thought it more instructive not to repeat this development in the text but,
instead, to provide a detailed quantitative analysis of the cases of k = 3 and k = 4
alternatives.  These two cases offer new insights into the kinds of games that two
bargainers might play, which the characterization of Nash equilibria given by Theorems
A7 and A8 does not illuminate.  These theorems, nevertheless, are used to determine the
equilibria in the two cases.24
The strategies associated with the four underscored outcomes—all involving truthfulness
by one bargainer and untruthfulness by the other—occur in essentially the only two-
bargainer, three-alternative cases in which truthfulness on the part of one bargainer is not
a best response to truthfulness on the part of the other.  In effect, this game is an
expanded version of the classic 2 x 2 Chicken game.
But each bargainer can submit any of six possible orderings, producing a more
complex, but still Chicken-like, game.  Assume that B1’s preference order is abc, and
B2’s is bac.  The the ten possible pure-strategy Nash equilibria are indicated by asterisks
in Figure 1.  Observe that if
• B1 submits an ordering consistent with any equilibrium {a} (its most-preferred
   outcome); and
• B2 submits an ordering consistent with any equilibrium {b} (its most-preferred
   outcome),
the Compromise Set is {c}, which is the worst outcome for both bargainers.  We repeat,
however, that this case (abc versus bac) is unusual in the sense that if there are three
alternatives, and the bargainers’ true preference orders are selected equiprobabily, then
the probability that truthful reporting is not a Nash equilibrium is only 1/6.
Does the relative invulnerability of fallback bargaining to manipulation hold when
there are more than three alternatives?  We next consider the case of k = 4 alternatives,
{a, b, c, d}, which each bargainer can rank in 4! = 24 different ways.  Holding fixed B1’s
preference ranking of abcd, we have analyzed when being truthful is a Nash equilibrium
in all four-alternative situations.  Our results follow:
1.  Truthfulness.  Truthfulness on the part of both bargainers is a Nash equilibrium
in 15 of the 24 cases (62.5%).  B2 can do no better than be truthful if its rankings are as
follows:25
• abcd, abdc, acbd, acdb, adbc, and adcb, all giving {a}
• bcda and bdca, both giving {b};
• cdab and cdba, giving {a, c} and {b, c}, respectively;
• dabc and dacb, both giving {a};
• dbca, dcab, dcba, giving {b}, {a, c}, and {b, c}, respectively.
2.  Chicken.  There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the three games in
which B2’s truthful ranking is bacd, badc, or cbad (12.5%).  To illustrate these three
games, consider the game in which B2’s truthful ranking is bacd.  The Compromise Sets
associated with Nash equilibria in the following 2 x 2 game, which are underscored,
involve one bargainer’s being truthful while the other is not:
 B2
                bacd       bdca
                abcd    {a, b}      {b}
         B1
   adcb       {a}        {d}
This game is analogous to our earlier 2 x 2 game of Chicken—in which each bargainer
ranked only three alternatives—except now the “disastrous” outcome when both
bargainers are untruthful (i.e., {d}) is ranked fourth rather than third by both of them.
Of course, this 2 x 2 game is only a microcosm of the 24 x 24 game that the
bargainers would actually play.  Application of Theorem A6 shows that several of the
other 22 strategies for each bargainer are in equilibrium.  For example, B1’s choice of
acdb, acbd, or adbc also results in {a} if B2 is truthful by announcing bacd.  Similarly,
B2 has three additional Nash equilibrium strategies that it can use against B1’s truthful
announcement of abcd.  All these games are, in a sense, expanded versions of Chicken.
3.  Best Response.  One bargainer has a best response, which is untruthful, to the
other bargainer’s truthful announcement, but not vice versa, in 6 of the 24 cases (25%).
When such one-sided manipulation is possible, the resulting Nash equilibrium yields a26
pair of alternatives that favors the untruthful bargainer (1st and 2nd choices) over the
truthful bargainer (1st and 3rd choices):
• Assume B1 is truthful and announces abcd.  Then if B2’s truthful rankings are
cabd, cadb, or cbad, B2’s best responses are cdab, cdab, and cdba, respectively, resulting
in {a, c}, {a, c}, and {b, c}.
• Assume B2 is truthful and announces bcad, bdac, or dbac.  Then B1’s best
responses are adbc, acbd, and acbd, respectively, resulting in {a, b} in each case.
Discussion.  In the games in which B1 and B2 do not agree on a first choice, the
cases vulnerable to strategic manipulation increase from 16.7% (1 out of 6) in the three-
alternative case to 37.5% (9 out of 24) in the four-alternative case.  We hypothesize that
the strategic incentives for manipulation continue to increase, even on a proportional
basis, as the number of alternatives increases.
On the other hand, the benefits of manipulation may be illusory in some of these
situations.  Because the game is Chicken in the one case vulnerable to manipulation when
k = 3, and in three cases when k = 4, the risks are as great as the benefits.  Instead of
ensuring at least a next-best outcome by being truthful, a bargainer choosing an optimal
manipulative strategy in Chicken risks its worst outcome in attempting to obtain its best
outcome.  We believe that many bargainers, using fallback bargaining, would choose not
to court disaster in Chicken, even if they had complete information about their
opponent’s preferences.
By contrast, the six best-response cases in the four-outcome games are “safe” in the
sense that the other bargainer has no counter-response that yields it a better outcome.
Hence, the untruthful bargainer can use a manipulative strategy with impunity, because a
rational opponent has no recourse—it can do no better than be truthful.
But the benefits of such manipulation are not great:  an optimal strategy in the best-
response cases ensures the untruthful player of either its best or next-best outcome instead27
of, unfailingly, its next-best outcome when it is truthful.15  Furthermore, because each
bargainer has the opportunity of using a best-response strategy in only three of the 24
cases (12.5%), there are relatively few occasions in which to exploit such a strategy.
In the best-response cases, notice that the preferences of the bargainers are neither
coincident nor diametrically opposed.  Thus, for example, if B1 truthfully announces
abcd, B2 can be exploitative by being untruthful only if its truthful preferences are cabd,
cadb, or cbad.  In each case, what is best for B2 is next-worst for B1.
Most real-life bargaining situations, of course, are suffused with incomplete
information, to which our theoretical results on Nash equilibria in the three-outcome and
four-outcome complete-information games are not applicable.  Nevertheless, there is
certainly something Chicken-like in many bargaining situations; our findings support this
view, suggesting risks even when information is complete.
Under fallback bargaining, the bargainers’ rankings of alternatives completely
determine which one(s) will be chosen.  Because a bargainer has less opportunity to “feel
out” the resolve of an opponent when this procedure is invoked than when there is
endless haggling, we think that fallback bargainers will be reluctant to risk disaster, at
least in Chicken.  Moreover, if the bargainers have incomplete information about each
other’s preferences, they may not even know that they are playing Chicken—or one of the
more numerous games in which truthfulness is an optimal strategy.  Thus, it will often
pay for them to exercise caution by being truthful under fallback bargaining.
7.  Conclusions
Possible Bias.  While fallback bargaining seems a promising procedure for
inducing compromises, it is legitimate to ask how the alternatives on which the procedure
                                          
15To be sure, a reasonable chance of getting one’s best alternative, versus negotiating a
compromise that reflects an “average” of one’s best and next-best alternatives, will not be
trivial if there is a big difference between these two alternatives, as measured by their
cardinal-utility values.28
operates might be generated.  If the alternatives are strongly biased in favor of one
bargainer, then the procedure’s selection of a Pareto-optimal and middling outcome is a
cruel joke against the bargainer or bargainers suffering this bias.
Generating Alternatives.  One possible solution to the bias problem is to allow
the bargainers themselves to propose different alternatives.  If the bargaining is over a
future contract between labor and management, for example, each side could propose
alternative agreements that have similar cost implications, albeit in opposite directions.
A neutral party might be used to assess that each side’s alternative proposals more or less
match the gains and losses of each other, or are equidistant from the status quo.  Fallback
bargaining would then enable the bargainers to leapfrog the give-and-take of conventional
bargaining, which often bogs down in details, by finding a suitable settlement through the
simultaneous consideration of all alternatives.
Correspondence to Real-Life Compromises.  We think the give-and-take of
conventional bargaining, especially that which results in the successful settlements of
disputes, often approximates what fallback bargaining formalizes.  This is probably
especially true in business disputes, in which the costs and benefits of alternative
agreements can often be calculated with some precision.
In personal disputes, including divorce, this assessment is undoubtedly harder.  For
this purpose procedures like “adjusted winner,” in which the parties can allocate points
over the items (goods or issues) in dispute, may be more practicable (Brams and Taylor,
1996).
Normative Advantages.  We believe that one important advantage of fallback
bargaining over the give-and-take of traditional negotiations is that it allows for many
different proposals to be on the table at once.  Moreover, no decisions need be made
about features that are acceptable or not acceptable—as in the usual step-by-step
bargaining—in order for the parties to “advance” to a next stage.  Indeed, advancing in
fallback bargaining means generating new ideas, or packaging them in different ways,29
both of which may be facilitated by a mediator’s making independent proposals, or
combining parts of old ones, that are then put on the table as new alternatives.
In the end, of course, these alternatives must be ranked by the parties, but it may
not be clear, even to them, how best to do this until there are no more proposals put
forward.  Although it is possible that the parties will try to anticipate each others’ choices
and strategize when they announce their rankings, we think this would be extremely
difficult if there are, say, ten or more alternatives on the table.16  As we have illustrated
with only three or four alternatives and two bargainers, misrepresenting one’s preferences
may sometimes allow one to reap large benefits—but can dangerously backfire as well, to
the detriment of all.
The Role of Impasse.  We have mixed feelings about allowing the bargainers to
incorporate impasse (I) into their rankings.  On the one hand, some bargainers might
genuinely prefer I to any agreement below it and should be entitled to so indicate their
position.  On the other hand, the inclusion of I may lead to continuing disagreement that
is not authentic, because it allows for, and may even encourage, strategizing beyond that
which would occur without I.
Without I, fallback bargaining ensures some agreement and, therefore, closure of
the negotiation process.  But the middling outcome produced may not be a Condorcet
winner, as we showed, or possess other desirable features.
Fairness.  If there are more than two bargainers, it may be advisable to relax the
unanimity rule, assuming this is acceptable to the bargainers.  A simple or qualified-
majority decision rule will, in general, be more likely to find Condorcet alternatives, if
                                          
16When there are relatively few alternatives, fallback bargaining is more likely to produce
ties, which suggests that there needs to be a device for selecting one alternative from
Compromise Sets that contain more than one.  Sertel and Yilmaz (1997) offer different
suggestions for breaking ties, including choosing the alternative with the most first-
choice approvals, then second-choice approvals, and so on.  One might also choose the
alternative with the highest average approval.30
they exist, than does fallback bargaining (with unanimity).17  But the choice of a
Condorcet alternative could be at the price of inflicting on some bargainers outcomes
that, while Pareto-optimal, are quite damaging.  In such cases, a middling outcome for
everybody may be fairer.
We mention these effects of the inclusion of I, and the weakening of the unanimity
decision rule, to underscore that, as always, there are trade-offs.  Although most of our
analysis has been of fallback bargaining, which assumed unanimity and was often for
only two bargainers, further consideration of the multibargainer case, with a non-
unanimous decision rule and the inclusion of I, would be desirable.18
                                          
17On these and other grounds, Sertel and Sanver (1997) argue that the Majoritarian
Compromise, which presumes a simple-majority decision rule, would be desirable in
certain kinds of elections in Turkey.  Also at a normative level, Brams and Fishburn
(1983) argue for approval voting in multicandidate elections.  The approval-voting
winner and the Majoritarian Compromise will coincide if (i) all voters indicate the same
level of approval in making their selections and (ii) that level is the depth at which  a
majority winner appears for the first time.  Approval voting, in contrast to q-approval
fallback bargaining, makes no presumption of the lockstep descent of all voters to lower
and lower levels of approval until a q-approval winner appears; instead, it leaves open to
the voter where he or she draws the line between acceptable and unacceptable candidates.
Although this is somewhat akin to bargainers’ indicating I in their preference rankings—
below which alternatives are unacceptable—there is no descent process under approval
voting:  all candidates approved of receive their votes at the start.  Insofar as voters do
rank candidates, their rankings are unexpressed and, therefore, invidious.
18In the context of elections, it is worth mentioning those for a council or legislature, in
which there are multiple winners and one wishes to achieve proportional representation
(PR).  In this situation, we believe it sensible to set q relatively low (e.g., the size of the
electorate divided by the size of the legislature, or the size of an average constituency).
Then one would elect candidates who are ranked relatively high by relatively few
voters—the number in an average-size constituency—which would help to ensure that a
diversity of views is represented and thereby satisfy PR.  Related PR systems are
analyzed in Potthoff and Brams (1998).31
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A1
APPENDIX
Assume there are n bargainers, and the set of alternatives (possible agreements) is K,
where |K| = k.  Preferences of the bargainers over the alternatives are specified by an n × k
matrix A = (a ) such that, for i = 1, 2, ... , n, the i  row of A is a permutation of K ij
th
representing the ranking (in descending order) of bargainer i. 
For each bargainer, i, and each alternative x 0 K, define j (x) to be the value of j i
A
satisfying a  = x.  Thus, j (x) is bargainer i’s ranking for alternative x.  Define i’s ij i
A
satisfaction with alternative x by h (x) = k ! j (x).  Usually, j (x) and h (x) can be ii i i
AA A A
denoted j(x) and h(x), respectively, with no possibility of confusion.  Note that a  is i’s ii i1
most preferred alternative, so j (a ) = 1 and h (a ) = k ! 1. ii 1 ii 1
AA
To describe fallback bargaining formally, define the set of depth d agreements as 
for d = 0, 1, 2, ..., k.  Note that CS  is the set of all alternatives that are among the top d in d
the ranking of every bargainer.  Thus, any outcome in CS  produces a minimum d
satisfaction level of k ! d for every bargainer.  Clearly, 
Next, define the (bargaining) depth, d*, by 
Because of the chain of containment relations above, d* is well-defined.  The
Compromise Set, CS(A) = CS, is the subset of K defined by  CS = CS .  Thus, the d*
Compromise Set is the set of all alternatives that are among the first d* in the ranking of
every bargainer, where d* is the smallest value that makes this set non-empty.  In terms of
satisfaction, every alternative in CS gives every bargainer a satisfaction level of at least k
! d*, and any alternative not in CS gives at least one bargainer a satisfaction level strictly
less than k ! d*.  This observation demonstrates that CS is identical to the Kant-Rawls
Social Compromise Hurwicz and Sertel (1997).A2
  Bounds on the size of CS f K can be found easily. 
Lemma A1.1   # |CS| # min{d*, n}.  
Proof. Because  CS is non-empty, |CS| $ 1.  Because every element of CS must
appear among each bargainer’s d* highest ranked alternatives, |CS| #
d*.  Because CS  = i, every element of CS is the d*  entry in the d* ! 1
th
ranking of some bargainer.  There are only n bargainers, so |CS| # n
follows. 
The bargaining depth, d*, can be as low as 1, when all bargainers rank the same
alternative first.  The maximum value of d* is given by 
Theorem A1. d* # lk ! k/n + 1m .
Proof.  The first d entries of all n rows of A contain nd items, some of which
may be duplicates.  Each item is one of the k alternatives in K.  By the
pigeonhole principle, some alternative must appear at least jnd/kk times.
Now suppose that d > k ! k/n.  Because nd/k > n ! 1, some
alternative must appear n times in the first d items of all rows.  This
implies that d $ d*.  If k ! k/n is integral, we have shown that 
d* # k ! k/n + 1; if not, we have shown that d* # jk ! k/nk.  The
conclusion now follows easily.
We now demonstrate by example that the bound in Theorem A1 is tight.  That is,
for any n and k, it is possible to find an n × k  matrix A such that the bargaining depth d*
= lk ! k/n + 1m.  We take K = {1, 2, ... , k}.
If n $ k, a matrix with the required property is easy to construct; simply choose A so
that, for i = 1, 2, ..., k, a  = i.  Thus, each of the first k rows of A has a different final ik
entry, guaranteeing that d* = k.
Assume that n < k and let p = jk/nk.  For i = 1, 2, ... , n, and j = 1, 2, ... , k, define thea Ak
ij ' [(i & 1)p % j]m o d k .
A A11 '
123456789 1 0 1 1
56789 1 0 1 11234
9 1 0 1 112345678
,
A A12 '
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 91 01 11 2
5 6 7 8 91 01 11 2 1 2 3 4
91 01 11 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
,
CSd







2 f ... f CS
q
k ' K .




entries of A  by
Ak
It is easy to verify that, for the matrix A  so defined, d* = k ! p + 1.  For example, if n =
Ak
3 and k = 11,
so d* = 8, whereas if n = 3 and k = 12, 
so d* = 9.
Now we generalize the definition of fallback bargaining to q-approval fallback
bargaining, where 1 # q # n.  As indicated in the text, the idea is to weaken the conditions
for compromise so that acceptance by only q bargainers is required for a compromise. 
Therefore, define the set of q-approval agreements of depth d by  
for d = 0, 1, 2, ..., k.  Thus, CS  is the set of all alternatives that are ranked among the top d
q
d by at least q bargainers.  This definition generalizes fallback bargaining, which sets q =
n.  Thus, CS  = CS .  Clearly, dd
n
Define the (q-approval fallback bargaining) depth, d *, by  q
Because of the chain of containment relations above, d * is well-defined.  The q-approval q
Compromise Set, CS  is the subset of K defined by CS  = CS  where d = d *.  Thus, the
qq q
dq
q-approval Compromise Set is the set of all alternatives that are among the d * highest qh q(x) ' max h : i : hi(x) $ h $ q .
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ranked for at least q bargainers, where d * is the smallest value that makes this set non- q
empty.
We now characterize the q-approval Compromise Set in terms of satisfaction.  For
alternative x 0 K, recall that bargainer i’s satisfaction level is h(x) = k ! j(x).  Define the ii
q-satisfaction level of x by 
Thus, for at least q bargainers the level of satisfaction at x is at least h (x), but there are
q
fewer than q bargainers whose level of satisfaction at x strictly exceeds h (x).  In other
q
words, h (x) is the minimum satisfaction level of the q most satisfied bargainers at x.
q
Theorem A2. Let x 0 K.  Then x 0 CS  if and only if x maximizes h (x).  The
qq
maximum value of h (x) is k ! d *.
q
q
Proof. For any x 0 K, x 0 CS  if and only if there are at least q different d
q
bargainers, i, for whom j(x) # d, i.e., h(x) $ k ! d.  First suppose that x ii
0 CS .  Because CS  = CS  for d = d *, it follows that there are at least
qq q
dq
q different bargainers, i, for whom h(x) $ k ! d *, so h (x) $ k ! d *.  iq q
q
Suppose that h (x) = h > k ! d *.  Then there are at least q bargainers, i, qq
for whom h(x) $ h, i.e.,  j(x) # k ! h, so  ii
CS  û i.  But k ! h < d *, and d * is the minimum value of d for k ! hq q
q
which CS  û i.  This contradiction shows that if x 0 CS , then  d
qq
h (x) = k ! d *.
q
q
Now suppose that x Û CS .  Then there are fewer than q different
q
bargainers, i, for whom j(x) # d *, i.e., h(x) $ k ! d *.  Therefore, h (x) iq i q
q
< k ! d *.  We have shown that the maximum value of h (x) is k ! d *, q q
q
and this value is attained if and only if x 0 CS .
q
Bounds on the size of CS  f K are easily found.
q
Lemma A2. 1 # |CS | # min{nd*/q, n}.
qdq( 'l
kq & k % n
n m .
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Proof. The proof that 1 # |CS | # n is exactly as in Lemma A1.  Every element
q
of CS  must appear at least q times among the d * highest-ranked
q
q




The bargaining depth, d *, can be as low as 1, when there is one alternative that is q




Proof. As in Theorem A1, the pigeonhole principle shows that some
alternative must appear at least jnd/kk times in the first d entries of all n
rows of A.  If d > k(q ! 1)/n, then nd/k > q ! 1, which implies that d $
d *.  If k(q ! 1)/n is integral, this proves that  q
d * # k(q ! 1)/n + 1; if not, if proves that d * # jk(q ! 1)/nk.  The q
q
conclusion now follows directly.
The construction given above, exemplified by A  and A , can be used to demonstrate
A11 A12
that the bound in Theorem A3 is the best possible.
We now show that, for any value of q, the q-approval Compromise Set, CS  ,
q
contains only Pareto-optimal alternatives.  Recall that alternative y is Pareto-superior to
alternative x, written y   x, if and only if j(y) < j(x) for all i = 1, 2, ... , n.  If x has the ii
property that no y exists such that y   x, then x is Pareto-optimal.
Theorem A4. If x 0 CS , then x is Pareto-optimal.
q
Proof. We prove that if x is not Pareto-optimal, then x Û CS .  Assume that 
q
y   x, that the bargaining depth is d * = d, and that x 0 CS  = CS .  qd
qqCSId ' x 0 K : ji(x) # min {d, ji(I)} é i ' 1,2,..., n .
CSI0 ' ifCSI1 f CSI2 f ... f CSIk f K .
d( ' min { d : CSId ûi },
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Then there exists a set of bargainers, B f {1, 2, ... , n}, such that  |B| $
q and j(x) # d for all i 0 B.  But for every i = 1, 2, ..., n,  i
j(y) < j(x).  Thus, for every i 0 B, j(y) # d ! 1.  It follows that  ii i
CS  û i, contradicting the hypothesis that the bargaining depth is d.  d ! 1
q
The conclusion now follows.
Now we provide a formal description of fallback bargaining with impasse.  For
each of the n bargainers, a preference ranking on K c {I} is assumed, where I represents
“Impasse” and K is the set of alternatives.  (Note that I Û K.)  If |K| = k, then the
bargainers’ preferences are specified by an n × (k + 1)  matrix B = (b ) such that, for i = 1, ij
2, ... , n, the i  row of B is bargainer i’s ranking (in descending order).  For each
th
bargainer, i, and alternative x 0 K, denote by  j (x) the value of j satisfying b  = x, and by ii j
B
j (I) the value of j satisfying b  = I. ii j
B
Now, for d = 0, 1, 2, ..., k, define the set of depth d agreements as 
Note that CS  is the set of all alternatives that are among the top d in the ranking of every d
bargainer, and that every bargainer prefers to I.  Clearly, 
Note that CSI  = i is possible; it occurs when no alternative is preferred by every k
bargainer to I.  
The Compromise Set with Impasse, CSI(B) = CSI, is defined by CSI = {I} if 
CSI  = i.  Otherwise, define the bargaining depth, d*, by  k
and define CSI = CSI .  Thus, the Compromise Set with Impasse consists of either d*
Impasse, or of all alternatives that are (i) preferred by every bargainer to I, and (ii)  among
the top d* in the ranking of every bargainer; here, d* is the smallest value that makes this
set non-empty.
The next result connects fallback bargaining with and without impasse.A7
Theorem A5. In fallback bargaining with impasse, let the alternative set be K and let
the n × (k + 1) matrix B represent preferences.  Then 
CSI(B) û i, and, if I 0 CSI(B), then CSI(B) = {I}.  If x 0 K and x 0
CSI(B), then x   I.  Construct the n × k matrix A by deleting I from each
row of B.  If x   I and x 0 CS(A), then x 0 CSI(B).
Proof. First note that, by construction, either CSI(B) = {I} or CSI(B) = CSI  for d
some d such that CSI  û i.  Moreover, CSI  f K.  Thus  dd
CSI(B) û i, and either CSI(B) = {I} or CSI(B) f K.  Now suppose that x
0 K and x 0 CSI(B).  Then x must precede I in the ranking of each
bargainer, i, so x   I.  Finally, suppose that x   I and x 0 CS(A).  If x Û
CSI(B), then there exists y 0 K such that y   I and 
max {j (y)} < max {j (x)}.  But, for each i, j (y) < j (I) and  ii ii i i
BB B B
j (x) < j (I), which implies that j (y) = j (y) and j (x) = j (x).  It ii ii ii
BB AB AB
follows that max {j (y)} < max {j (x)}, contradicting the assumption ii ii
AA
that  x 0 CS(A).  
Corollary A1. All elements of CSI(B) are Pareto-optimal.
Proof. First suppose that CSI(B) = {I}.  By construction, there is no x 0 K such
that j (x) < j (I) for all i = 1, 2, ..., n, so I is Pareto-optimal.  Otherwise, ii
BB
suppose that x 0 K and x 0 CSI(B).  As demonstrated in the proof of
Theorem A5, no alternative y 0 K Pareto-superior to x can exist.  Thus x
is Pareto-optimal.
Now we turn to the question of one bargainer’s best response to another’s ranking. 
The next theorem concerns the optimal ranking choice for bargainer B1 when B1 knows
the ranking of its opponent, B2.  For simplicity, we assume that 
K = {1, 2, ... , k}, and that B1’s true preference ranking over K is given (in descending
order) by the permutation E = <1, 2, ... , k>.  For now, we assume that B1 knows that B2’sA8
ranking will be the permutation b = <b , b , ... , b >.  B1 can submit any permutation a = 12 k
<a , a , ... , a >. 12 k
Define a bargaining matrix A(a, b) by constructing a 2 × k matrix with first row a
and second row b.  Let CS(a, b) = CS(A(a, b)) denote the Compromise Set for this matrix. 
As a ranges over all permutations of K, many different Compromise Sets can arise. 
Denote this collection of subsets of K by P(b) f 2 , the power set of K.  B1’s objective is
K
to pick a permutation a such that CS(a, b) is most preferred within P(b) (according to
B1’s true preference ordering, E).
B1’s preference ordering, E = <1, 2, ..., k> is defined on K rather than 2 .  To
K
represent B1’s preferences on 2 , and therefore on P(b), we assume that 
K
(A1) If 1 # r < s # k, then {r}   {s}.
(A2) If S f K and |S|$ 2, then min{r: r 0 S}   S   max{r: r 0 S}.
where S    S  means that B1 prefers S  to S .  This preference ordering is a minimal 12 1 2
extension from a complete order on K to a partial order on 2 .  Note that using this partial
K
order, we cannot say whether B1 prefers {1, 3} or {2}; we know only that {1}   {1, 2} 
{2}   {2, 3}   {3} and  {1}   {1, 2}   {1, 3}   {2, 3}   {3}.  
Given b, we say that a permutation a = a* = <a *, a *, ... , a *> is a best response 12 k
for B1 if CS(a*, b) = CS*(b) is maximal within P(b) according to this partial ordering.  In
general, it is possible for P(b) to have many maximal elements; as will be seen below,
however, the maximal subset (with respect to the partial order defined above) is always
unique in this case.  If so, we call the unique maximal subset CS*(b) an optimal
compromise for B1, and call any a* such that CS(a*, b) = CS*(b) an optimal response for
B1.  If CS(E, b) = CS*(b), then B1 can do no better than to respond truthfully to b.  We
call b incentive-compatible (for B1) in this case.
For t = 1, 2, ... , k, define the top-t set of b by U(b, t) = {b , b , ... , b}.  Thus U(b, t) 12 t
is the set consisting of the first t elements in B2’s permutation.  Similarly, define the  top-
t set of E = <1, 2, ... , k> by U(E, t) = {1, 2, ... , t}.  
It is convenient to identify best responses according to the parity of the alternative
set.  The next theorem describes the case when the number of alternatives is odd. ai( '
ws if i ' vs 0 V
vs if i ' ws 0 W and s # |V|
i otherwise
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Theorem A6. Fix b, and suppose that k = 2h ! 1 where h is integral.  Define r = b = f
min {s: s 0 U(b, h)}.  Then CS* = {r}, and b is incentive-compatible
for B1 if either r $ f or r < f and U(b, f) 1 U(E, f)= {b}.  Otherwise, V = f
{s: r < s # f and s 0 U(b, f)} û i.  In this case, b is not incentive-
compatible for B1; to construct an optimal response, define W = {s 0 K
! U(b, f): s > f}.  Then |V| # |W|, so given any enumerations of V = {v , 1
v , ... } and W = {w , w , ... }, a* can be constructed as follows: 21 2
Proof: First, note that the bound given by Theorem A1 is d* # h.  Thus the
fallback process must end within h steps, and the best compromise set
that B1 can hope to achieve is {r} = {b}.  Note that f # h.  We show f
that this Compromise Set can always be achieved by an appropriate
choice of a*.  In fact, it is easy to verify that CS(E, b) = {r} whenever r
$ f or r < f and U(b, f) 1 U(1, f)= {b}, so b is incentive-compatible for f
B1 in this case, and CS* = {r}.  
Now assume that r < f.  It is easy to show that 
U(b, f) 1 U(E, f) = V c {b}.  The case that remains to be settled occurs f
when V û i; if so, CS(E, b) must contain an alternative other than r (it
may contain r also). 
We show how to achieve {r} = CS*(b).  The overlap set V is the
set of possible compromises that might supplant {r}; they follow r in
B1’s ordering, but precede it in B2’s.  The permutation a* constructed
as indicated is identical to E = <1, 2, ... , k>, except that all entries in V
are interchanged with entries in W.  This works because W contains
only alternatives s that follow b in b, so cannot be in CS(a*, b).  Also f
the entries of V and W cannot coincide, because s 0 V implies s # f, and
s 0 W implies s > f.  ai( '
bh % i if 1 # i # h
bf if i ' h % 1
bi & h & 1 if h % 2 # i < h % 1 % f
bi & h if h % 1 % f # i # 2h .
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It remains to show that |V| # |W|.  The elements of U(b, f) that do
not exceed f are r and the elements of V.  Because |V| + 1 of the f entries
of U(b, f) are less than or equal to f, f ! |V| ! 1 entries must exceed f. 
But in all of K, only 2h ! 1 ! f elements exceed f.  Thus W, which
contains exactly the elements that exceed f and fall in K but not U(b, f),
must contain exactly 
|W| = 2h ! 1 ! f ! [f ! |V| ! 1] = 2h ! 2f + |V| entries.  Because f # h, if
follows that |V| # |W|, completing the proof.
When the number of alternatives is even, the situation is a little more complicated, as
shown next:
Theorem A7.F i x   b, and suppose that k = 2h, where h is integral.  Define r = b = min f
{s: s 0 U(b, h)}.  If r < b , then CS* = {r}, and b is incentive- h + 1
compatible for B1 if either r $ f or r < f and 
U(b, f) 1 U(E, f) = {b}.  Otherwise, b is not incentive-compatible for f
B1, and a* as constructed in Theorem A5 produces CS(a*, b) = {r}.  If
r > b , then CS* = {r, b } and b is incentive-compatible for B1 if h + 1 h + 1
and only if r = h + 1.  Otherwise, an optimal response for B1 is 
Proof. Note that the bound given by Theorem A1 is d* # h + 1.  The fallback
process must end within h steps, producing a Compromise Set
containing either one or two elements of U(b, h), or end in exactly h + 1
steps, producing a Compromise Set containing b  and one element of h + 1
U(b, h).  It can be verified directly that, subject to these restrictions, the
most preferred compromise set that B1 can achieve is CS* = {r} if r =
b < b , and CS* = {r, b } if r > b .  Again, the plan of the proof is fh  + 1 h + 1 h+1A11
to show that these possibilities can always be achieved.  
First, if  r < b , the proof of Theorem A6 can be mimicked to h + 1
demonstrate that b is incentive-compatible for B1 if either r $ f or 
r < f and U(b, f) 1 U(E, f)= {b}, and that otherwise b is not incentive- f
compatible for B1, and an optimal response a* can be constructed
exactly as in Theorem A6.
Now suppose that r > b .  Then B1 prefers b  to any of b , b , h+1 h + 1 1 2
... , b .  It is easy to verify that if B1 submits the ordering E = <1, 2, ..., h
k>, then the result will be CS* = {r, b } if and only if r = h + 1, h + 1
which means that the first h elements of b are the last h elements in
B1’s true preference ordering.  
If r < h + 1, it is easy to verify directly that b  Û CS(E, b).  h + 1
Under the preference order on P(b) defined above, {r, b }   {r} ë  h + 1
CS(E, b).  It is not difficult to verify directly that a*, as constructed
above, produces CS(a*, b) = {r, b }.  h + 1
The text contains examples showing the application of Theorems A6 and A7.
One example, given in the text for k = 9 (A ), is worth elaborating in general.  It
19
shows that the potential benefits of using a* rather than the truthful ordering are
unlimited.  Suppose that k = 2h ! 1, where h is integral, and that 
b = <h ! 1, h, ... , 2h ! 3, 1, 2, ... , h ! 2, 2h ! 2, 2h ! 1>
Note that b  = 1, and that CS(E, b) = {h ! 1}.  By Theorem A6, CS*(b) = {1} because r = h
1 and f = h.  Using V = {h ! 1, h} and W = {2h ! 2, 2h ! 1}, the optimal Compromise Set
CS*(b) = {1} can be achieved by the optimal response
a* = <1, 2, ... , h ! 2, 2h ! 2, 2h ! 1, h +1, ... , 2h ! 3, h ! 1, h>
Note that the use of the best response improved the Compromise Set from {h ! 1} to {1},A12
relative to the truthful response, E.  
We end this Appendix with a characterization of truthful equilibria, which are
illustrated in the text.  We continue with the assumptions introduced earlier to define a
partial preference order for B1 on P(b), and apply them also to B2 to produce a partial
order on P(a).  We use subscripts to indicate which partial order is being referred to; for
instance, s    s  means s  is preferred to s  according to ordering a—in other words, that 1 a 21 2
s  precedes s  in a.  Likewise, if S f K, then max {S} is the most-preferred element in S 12 a
according the ranking a, and max {S} is the most-preferred element in S according the b
preference ranking b.  As usual, the ranking is in descending order of preference, so
alternatives earlier in the ranking are more preferred.
Let CS*(b; a) represent the optimal Compromise Set for B1, based on preference
permutation a, given that B2’s ranking is b, and let CS*(a; b) represent the optimal
Compromise Set for B2, based on preference permutation b, given that B1’s ranking is a. 
The pair of rankings (a, b) represents a Nash equilibrium if and only if CS(a, b) = CS*(b;
a) = CS*(a; b), in other words, if a is a best response to b for B1, given that a represents
B1’s true preference ranking, and b is a best response to a for B2, given that b represents
B2’s true preference ranking.  
The next two theorems characterize all Nash equilibrium pairs of rankings.  As
usual, that the situation is more complicated when the number of alternatives is even.
Theorem A8. If k = 2h ! 1 is odd, then (a, b) is a Nash equilibrium pair if and only if
max {U(b, h)} = max {U(a, h)} = c and, for some d satisfying 1 # d # ab
h, U(a, d) 1 U(b, d) = {c}.
Proof. From Theorem A6, CS*(b; a) = max {U(b,h)} and CS*(a; b) = a
max {U(a, h)}, so the requirement that max {U(b, h)} =  ba
max {U(a, h)} follows from the definition of Nash equilibrium.  b
Assuming it is met, let the most-preferred common alternative be c. 
If, for some d, 1 # d # h, a  = b  = c, then Theorem A6 shows that dd
neither bargainer can do better than to submit its true preference
ordering.  Otherwise, suppose that b  = c and a = c, where f < d.  By dfA13
Theorem A6, B2 cannot do better than to submit b. To achieve c, it may
be necessary for B1 to submit an ordering other than a; this occurs if
and only if V û i, where 
V = {s 0 K: a   s ë  a  and s   b }.  But c 0 U(a, d) 1 U(b, d), and fa ad bd
U(a, d) 1 U(b, d)= {c} iff V = i.  The situation is analogous if c
appears earlier in b than in a.
Theorem A9. If k = 2h is even, define u  = max  {U(b, h)},  1 a
v  = max  {U(b, h + 1)}, u  = max  {U(a, h)}, and  1 a 2 b
v  = max  {U(a, h + 1)}.  Then (a, b) is a Nash equilibrium pair iff 2 b
either u  = v  = u  = v  = c and, for some d, 1 # d # h,  1122
U(a, d) 1 U(b, d) = {c}, or u  ñ  v , u  ñ  v , u  = v , u  = v , and  1 a 12 b 21 22 1
U(a, h + 1) 1 U(b, h + 1) = {u , u } = {v , v }. 12 12
Proof.  Based on Theorem A7, analogous to the relation of Theorem A8 to
Theorem A6.
The text contains examples illustrating Theorems A8 and A9.